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“Well you know, we have the President…”1 
Belarus is located at the heart of Europe but differs from most other European political systems. The 
president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, builds on the notion of Soviet nostalgia and ‘the good old 
days’. Nevertheless, his institutional practice somewhat differs from the political systems in contemporary 
Russia and in other post-Soviet states. Although Belarus has a parliament and regular elections, the vast 
majority of the parliament members are nonpartisan. This stands in contrast to the practice common in 
other post-Soviet nations. The main argument in this paper will be that due to the specific institutional 
and historical constraints, voters are more likely to elect candidates on a personal, rather than on a 
partisan level. This research would be conducted via cognitive field interviews (N = 18) with Belarusian 
constituencies. It will inquire why parties are practically irrelevant in the Belarusian parliament while 
they play a more significant role in Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Introduction 
Most contemporary authoritarian regimes are relying on political parties. Similarly to the rest of 
the former communist states, Belarus was left with a ready-made party structure following the 
fall of the Soviet Union. However, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, not only 
decided against using a party to gain his power, but has also refused to use the services of one 
ever since. The center of our attention will be the failure of political parties in Belarus, in light of 
their success elsewhere (i.e. in Kazakhstan and in Russia). This research would strive to 
complement existing literature on electoral systems and attitudes towards parties in authoritarian 
and specifically post-Soviet regimes. This research will also strive to add to the knowledge on 
Belarus and uncover its mysteries. As the tensions between Russia and the European Union (EU) 
are escalating, Belarus is located in the middle and is largely ignored or at least overlooked. It is 
time to shed light on innovation in authoritarian rule; Belarusian style. 
This research is constructed in three parts. We will begin with describing the inclination of the 
single-member-district (SMD) system for technically allowing independent candidates to be 
elected. Indeed, it could be the electoral system itself that instigates independents to compete for 
a place in the parliament
2
. While the parliaments of Russia and Kazakhstan mainly consist of 
partisan representatives (notwithstanding these parties’ political positions towards the 
government), in the Belarusian parliament partisan members are a mere minority (see figure 1). 
                                                          
1
 A recurring motive when talking to Belarusians about the lack of political parties in the parliament. 
2
 In this paper, all various lower houses of representatives will be called ‘parliaments’ and not by their official 
names, for efficiency and comfort. 
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The availability of the SMD system and its inheritance from the Soviet days provides for the 
possibility of independent parliament members to be elected. Thus, SMD allows for independent 
candidates, but does not cancel out the benefits candidates might receive from partisan 
membership. It has been suggested elsewhere that the system of SMD “works against the 
institutionalization of democratic politics in a newly competitive state”3. The second step would 
be investigating what was done by the government in concern of the political parties after the 
consolidation of power. The claim for the unavailability of parties in Belarus might be connected 
to the way the leader sought to be represented. The conscious choice of the anti-establishment 
path (which included the anti-party and anti-corruption rhetoric) might have caused deterioration 
in the popularity of parties in general. Thus for Lukashenko who rose to power as an independent 
(in contrast to Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan), it could have been more beneficial to remain party-
free (an anti-party man could be deemed to be closer to the people). 
Despite the notion that this brings us closer to the understanding of nonpartisan representation in 
Belarus, Russia again stands as a stark contradiction. Following an initial period, Putin did opt to 
join and head a political party. Consequently, we see that the SMD system and the initial 
institutional setting require one more piece to complete our puzzle. The political history of 
Belarus is burdened with critical junctions
4
. Building on such junctions, this paper is proposing 
that partisan domination is substituted in Belarus by reactionary rather than proactive ideas: 
control of opposition and prevention of internal threat to the presidential power. Control over 
parliament members is executed via clientelism
5
, rather than through party ties. In other words, it 
might be easier for Lukashenko to control and guide candidates and members of parliament 
through nonpartisan ties such as political or economic dependence. In addition, political parties 
in Belarus are usually devoid of traditional ideological substances and cannot offer their 
constituencies a voice in guiding general state policy. As an effect, the system concentrates on 
providing local, district based solutions rather than leading general, country-wide policies or 
                                                          
3
 Sarah Birch, “Single-Member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition”, Electoral Studies 24 (2005): 
283. 
4
 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctions: Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism”, World Polities 59, no. 3 (2007): 341-369; Paul Pierson, “Increasing 
Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, The American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 263-
265; Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science 2 
(1999): 399-400. 
5
 Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities”, Comparative Political 
Studies 33, no. 6/7 (2000): 845-879; Anna Grzymala-Buse, “Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State 
Formation”, Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4/5 (2008): 638-673. 
~ 3 ~ 
 
pushing for an ideological change. Such a passive rule in Belarus, in contrast to the more 
proactive regimes in Kazakhstan and Russia, could be called Defensive Authoritarianism. Our 
research is based on cognitive field interviews with randomly selected voters in Belarus
6
. The 
local view on the lack of political parties in Belarus is expected to shed more light on the 
political arena in that country. The aim of such analysis is to understand how the voters perceive 
the electoral and party systems by knowing who to vote for in absence of parties. 
Partisans and Nonpartisans: The SMD system in Belarus 
Many scholars have classified, refined and applied
7
 the various electoral systems employed in 
democratic regimes
8
. The electoral systems that interest us the most here are naturally 
majoritarian, proportional and mixed systems. Although each of the systems has yet more unique 
national variants, we can say the following in general: (a) The majoritarian system requires 
candidates either to win an absolute majority (of more than 50 per cent of the vote) or in some 
cases at least a plurality (“first-past-the-post”) to earn a seat in the parliament; (b) The 
proportional system aims to trade the greater efficiency of government formation in majoritarian 
systems for a larger inclusion of minorities. The seats are divided in accordance to the number of 
votes each party receives (taking into account the electoral threshold if present). (c) Finally, 
mixed systems combine the two aforementioned options. In Russia for instance
9
, half of the 
parliament members were elected through a majoritarian system and half through a proportional 
system
10
, while in Kazakhstan ten candidates were elected based on a proportional system and 67 
through SMD
11
. It is important to point out that even before the constitutional changes of 2007 
eliminated the participation of independent candidates in the parliamentary elections in Russia 
and Kazakhstan, the number of independent parliament members was never as large as is still the 
case in Belarus (see figure 1). 
                                                          
6
 For a more detailed overview of the process and a description of the selected population see appendix 1. 
7
 Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Rein 
Taagepera and Matthew S. Shuggart, Seats and Votes, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Arend Lijphart, 
“The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws”, The American Political Science Review 84, no. 2 (1990): 481-496. 
8
 Realizing that our story is about an autocracy, it is still important to present the origin and the research of the 
election system in Belarus (plural single-member district) with the aim of understanding its consequences. 
9
 Both Russia and Kazakhstan were examples to such a system before the constitutional changes, that took place in 
both countries in 2007 and eliminated the majoritarian part. 
10
 Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems”, International 
Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1997): 299-304. 
11
 Rico Isaacs, “The Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan, August 2007”, Electoral Studies 27, no. 2 (2008): 382. 
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Figure 1
12
 (percentage of independent members of parliament out of total per election)
13
: 
 
As suggested above, it is hypothesized that majoritarian systems would favor two-party 
configuration, while proportional representation (PR) electoral system would encourage a more 
fragmented party-system
14
. Indeed, PR systems are more likely to produce a system with a 
multitude of political parties, which are likely to yield more proportional results. Moreover, 
majoritarian systems are more likely to produce two-party systems
15
. Although all three 
countries in question are no full democracies
16
, nor are they near having fair elections, those 
elections do exist regularly
17
.The argument is that majoritarian electoral systems weaken the tie 
between the party, the candidate and the citizens because individual rather than partisan virtues 
of candidates are more emphasized
18
. Thus, the inherited Soviet system in which elections were 
held in a majoritarian method and allowed for independent candidates
19
 permitted the practice to 
continue well into the post-Soviet era
20
. Cox for instance identifies the historical transition of 
                                                          
12
 Praline Database on National Parliaments, N.D., http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp [accessed: 25 
February, 2015]; ‘1’ represents earliest elections cycle, while ‘6’ represents the latest. 
13
 Russia: 1993-2003 the system was mixed. 225 members elected based on the majoritarian system, and 225 based 
on proportional. Ukraine had the same system at 1994-2002 and again from 2012. 
14
 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (London: Methuen Press, 1954), 217; William H. Riker, “The Two-Party 
System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science”, American Political Science Review, 76 
(1982), 755-760. 
15
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 62, 166-168. 
16
 Although they were not suspected of being democratic at the time, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe suggests at a possible fall under the transition during the Third Wave: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 23-25. 
17TimmBeichelt, “Autocracy and Democracy in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine”, Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 
115-117. 
18
 Dawn Brancati, “The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide”, The Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 
(2008): 652-653. 
19
 Note: In the Soviet Union the practice of independent candidates was not unusual, as not all could become party 
members, although if they were designated to win, they were still doing so on the behalf of the party. 
20
 Robert G. Moser, “The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 
1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections”, Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (1995): 377-398. 
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more power to the parliament as the reason behind the increase in party identification and party 
significance in the West.
21
 Such aspects of partisan change assumed the increasing power of the 
House of Commons over the Monarch. Political parties now offered their constituencies 
participation in governance in exchange for the electoral support. 
Notably, studies have found that parties are gaining popularity in Russia: more people vote based 
on the party rather than on the personality of the candidates. In other words, voters in Russia 
connect parties with such notions as identity of the party’s leader, economic and social 
conditions
22
. This seems to be in contrast with the practices of party-based identity in Belarus. 
Albeit having currently as many as fifteen active political parties to choose from, potential voters 
could not name most of them by name. In fact, most would only name the Communist Party 
(While in practice two Communist Parties operate in Belarus today) and the Belarus Popular 
Front (BPF), which was the spear head of the opposition in the 1990’s but is rather weak 
nowadays. Others yet suggest the pro-Lukashenko Belaya Rus’ public movement as a political 
party, though it was never turned into a regular party. It would appear that in Belarus, party 
identification became only weaker with time. All the while, the practice in Russia points at the 
opposite direction. It suggests that parties in Russia are successful in creating party-centered 
ballots. Moreover, it shows that it is not impossible for voters to adjust to party-centered politics. 
Still, opposition parties such as Yabloko found it hard to find parliamentary success. 
Despite early promises, Yabloko entered the 21
st
 century on the wrong foot. Unfortunate 
decisions left the party struggling electorally and without sufficient financial backing
23
. That 
suggests that parties in Russia still struggle: even a relatively established and known party as 
Yabloko finds it difficult to win seats in the Russian parliament
24
. However, that might indicate 
an inability of opposition parties to gain power, due to their inability to supply potential voters 
with a voice in the government. In contrast, parties who can offer an ideological agenda (The 
Communist Party) or certain influence in the government (United Russia) gain more success. 
                                                          
21
 Gary W. Cox, “The Development of a Party-Oriented Electorate in England, 1832-1918”, British Journal of 
Political Science 16, no. 2 (1986): 208-211. 
22
 Timothy J. Colton and Henry E. Hale, Context and Party System Development: Voting in Russian Parliamentary 
Elections 1995–2004 in Comparative Perspective, (Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004): 1-2, 22-23. 
23
 Henry E. Hale, “Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 7 
(2004): 993-1020. 
24
 Martin Dewhirst, “Censorship and Restrictions on Freedom of Speech in Russia: 1986-1991-2001”, in The Legacy 
of the Soviet Union, eds. Wendy Slater and Andrew Wilson (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 200-201. 186-
207 
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Indeed, parties in Russia were making financial incentive to attract voters. United Russia was on 
the high at its first elections in 2004 and mainly relied on voters who considered the economy to 
be in a good shape and those by whom the level of democracy was seen as sufficient
25
. United 
Russia gave Putin the ability of installing a stronger organization than before (Unity
26
 was a 
fraction of smaller organizations made up for the parliamentary elections of 1999), which gave 
him a stricter control of the governing apparatus. This less official approach was supplemented 
by electoral reforms that were intended to increase the role of the parties (such as a move to a 
proportional system on the regional level)
27
. In other words, the change of the electoral system 
followed the initiation of stronger parties initiated, and not vice versa. 
Despite first signs suggested that Kazakhstan might be on its way to democratization and a 
strong parliament, the president soon began absorbing more and more power. One of the causes 
for such a turn of events were the challenges that the newly independent state had to deal with in 
the 1990’s. The economy was strongly integrated in the SU and Kazakhstan struggled in its first 
independent steps. Moreover, the geographic integrity of the republic was under question mainly 
due to the ethnic divide, which has also been mirrored in the political arena
28
. Nazarbayev used a 
party from the very first day for guaranteeing sustainable rule through securing economic 
stability, nationalization and general marginalization of other groups
29
. Once the decision to rule 
by party has been made, the next step was limiting the influence of opposition parties, for 
instance those parties based on ethnicity, religion or gender
30
. The Kazakhstani electoral system 
is described as a ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ (MMM) system. The voter had to cast two votes: 
one in the SMD system, and one for a party list. The former composed the majority of seats in 
the parliament, while a smaller share went to the proportionally elected seats
31
. Parties were 
                                                          
25
 Henry E. Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 92-107. 
26
United Russia is a pro-government party, is a result of a 2001 unification of a number of previous political parties, 
of which the most important for us are Unity and Our Home – Russia (when the former split from the latter in 1999). 
The pro-government political parties were used as a top-bottom structure to ensure control in the parliament and 
through the regions. It mainly began with Russia’s Choice (1993 – 1995), continued with Our Home – Russia (1995-
2001), and after a short use of Unity (1999 – 2001) the ruling elite uses United Russia (2001 - ) at present. 
27
 Ibid, 231-233. 
28RafisAbazov, “The 1999 Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan”, Electoral Studies 20, no. 2 (2001): 314-315. 
29
 Ryan Kennedy, “A Colorless Election: The 2005 Election in Kazakhstan, and What It Means for the Future of the 
Opposition”, Problems of Post-Communism 53, no. 6 (2006): 47-48. 
30Donnacha O Beachian, “Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan, September and October 2004”, Electoral Studies 
24, no. 4 (2005): 762-769. 
31
 Even though constitutions and seat number changed, the 2004 election, the last under this system, included 67 
seats for SMD electorate and ten for the proportional system for a combined of 77. 
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mainly divided among supporters of Nazarbayev, disillusioned elites and the opposition
32
. The 
stability of the regime in Kazakhstan is related to economic change, too. As noted above, 
Kazakhstan’s economy was extremely weak at the start, but is becoming stronger ever since. The 
national sources of income, such as natural resources and (independent) media outlets, are 
closely related to Nazarbayev and his elite. That success depends much on the ability of 
opposition movements to mobilize this new economic power of a developing upper-class to their 
support
33
. We can see that when economic growth offered opportunities for the opposition, the 
electoral system was changed to retain the position of the (pro-government) parties. 
Nevertheless, can we discuss parties in nondemocratic regimes using research on parties in 
democracies? Democracies are argued to have an inherent systematic need for political parties
34
. 
Parties are claimed to be interconnected with the democratic rule on a number of levels. Political 
parties help communicate the preferences of the political system and the citizens. Moreover, in 
the democratic sense the party serves as a mediator between the civic society and the state; 
channeling interests and preventing tyranny
35
. However, political parties are extremely common 
in less democratic regimes, too. Authoritarian regimes may maintain political parties for various 
reasons and to their advantage. Leaders of such regimes can use parties to control the military, 
exercise control over population and ensuring popular support, or for monitoring of elites on 
various levels thereby maintaining their loyalty to the common cause. Moreover, authoritarian 
parties are used to mobilize the masses. In sum, parties in authoritarian regimes are useful to 
penetrate and control society
36
. This makes the authoritarian party a literal tool of control in the 
hands of the party elites in a double way. A party in a dictatorship could be used to distribute 
spoils through offering career paths for sympathizers with the aim of gaining more popular 
support
37
 and eliminating potential emerging opposition from the inside by ‘sharing the cake’38. 
For the ruler, parties and other legislating organizations are institutions that help with the task of 
                                                          
32
 Ibid, 765-777. 
33Bhavna Dave, “Kazakhstan’s 2004 Parliamentary Elections: Managing Loyalty and Support for the Regime”, 
Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 1 (2005): 6-7, 12. 
34
 E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government, (New York: Rinehart, 1942), 1; John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 12-14. 
35
 Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 23-27. 
36
 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 30-
38. 
37
 Ibid, 77, 166-167. 
38
 Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism”, Annual Review of Political Science, 12 
(2009): 403-422; Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, “Political Order and One-Party Rule”, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 13 (2010): 123-143. 
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governing (also, for instance, through delivering the concerns of the people to the dictator)
39
. 
Those reasons make the absence of parties as relevant actors in the political system of Belarus 
even more interesting. 
In contrast, opposition to rule through political parties can be summarized in three claims. 
Firstly, conservatives often argue against parties because they are seen as a rival to the current, 
conservative social structure. New parties are a certain threat to the established elite. Secondly, 
administrative circles oppose the public-wide participation in politics due to a lack of efficiency. 
Finally, there are the ‘populists’ who accept public participation but not its organization, 
claiming that the current system is acceptable in terms of linking the citizens to the government. 
Huntington goes further to remark that a ‘no-party state’ is a legitimate state in a traditional 
society but the process of modernization turns the state into an ‘anti-party’40. It means that while 
originally, a state could legitimately exist without political parties; such practice is practically 
deemed impossible in modern societies. We see that the Belarusian case would suggest a certain 
combination of the three, with a stress on the last. If the current situation in Belarus provides for 
enough linkages with citizens, why have parties? To be clear, parties de jure exist in Belarus. 
Moreover, political parties are not outlawed in Belarus, as they are elsewhere. Additionally, real 
opposition movements are legally allowed to form political parties. The staggering fact here is 
that Lukashenko himself avoids using a party mechanism to his own help
41
. 
Lukashenko came to power some three years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Among 
other things, Lukashenko became famous for bringing various Soviet practices back; something 
that is often argued to generate his popular support. A political party however, was something he 
distanced himself from. Today, parliamentary elections in Belarus happen regularly on most 
occasions, and so exists a law which allows, promotes and specifies the activity of political 
parties on the political stage in Belarus
42
. True enough, a law on political parties does not ensure 
political freedom. However, this law proves one issue, at least on the face of things: political 
parties, and their virtue, are something that the Belarusian leadership is aware of. The issue of 
lawfulness came up more than once during the interviews, especially with Belarusians who were 
                                                          
39
 Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship, 79-80. 
40
 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 403-
407. 
41
 Kathleen J. Mihalisko, “Belarus: Retreat to Authoritarianism”, in Democratic Changes and Authoritarian 
Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
42
 Matthew Frear, “The Parliamentary Elections in Belarus, September 2012”, Electoral Studies, 33 (2014). 
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familiar with academic work. They stressed that the SMD system in Belarus and the alleged 
lawfulness of political parties (but the constitutional nonpartisan status of the president) are 
fundamental for a discussion on political parties. Consequently, parties are allowed, but in a 
system where it is the governmental apparatus that is setting the norm, it is crucial to see how 
Lukashenko shields his presidency from the possibility of adopting a party. If so, we see how the 
potential of active parties is rhetorically encouraged (but practically discouraged) by 
supplementing an unfavorable for local political parties electoral system (SMD) with dictating an 
unfavorable for them (nonpartisan presidency) governing practice. 
In comparison, nonpartisan members were a familiar face in the Russian parliament too (albeit to 
a smaller extent). Non-affiliated parliament members obtained seats in parliament in the 1990’s 
but that changed following the constitutional reforms of 2007. As seen in figure 1, despite 
partisan members being a majority, up until 2007 a certain share of independents was the norm. 
Russia had a mixed electoral system before the constitutional reform, as was highlighted earlier. 
225 of the 450 members of the parliament were elected in a nation-wide proportional system and 
the other half in a majoritarian system of SMD. A change to the electoral system was passed in 
Russia in 2005, thus taking full effect in the subsequent 2007 elections. It changed the mixed 
system into a complete proportional one (with a 7% threshold) of 450 seats, turning independent 
participation impossible
43
. However, the amount of independents in Russia and Kazakhstan was 
proportionally smaller than in Belarus even before these changes. The fact that authoritarian 
regimes can learn and adapt in prevailing against (would-be) democratic opposition
44
, helps in 
understanding the measures which Lukashenko takes to remain in power. The regime in Belarus 
appears to be basing itself on alleged democratic practices such as a legitimate electoral system, 
while supplementing it with other institutional ideas such as a nonpartisan presidential position, 
to create a working mechanism of connecting the government with the voters. This innovation 
through stagnation could prove to be useful for autocracies and democracies alike in terms of the 
alleged need for political parties. 
 
                                                          
43
 For an overview of the system and the institutional change: Erik S. Herron and Misa Nishikawa, “Contamination 
Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems”, Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 71; 
Bryon Moraski, “Electoral System Reform in Democracy’s Grey Zone: Lessons from Putin’s Russia”, Government 
and Opposition 42, no. 4 (2007): 541-543. 
44
 Thomas Ambrosio, “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future 
Research”, International Studies Perspectives, 11 (2010): 378-379. 
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Electoral systems and the Political Parties 
As most historical accounts will tell, Belarus had never existed as an independent entity, until the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War when it gained independence for a short period of 
time. However, it was quickly absorbed in the upcoming SU
45
. The next chance for 
independence materialized in 1991 when the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) 
proclaimed independence. Unlike in Kazakhstan where the president remained in power from the 
Soviet days and Russia, where the incoming president Yeltsin played a very active role in the 
transition, the Belarusian leader Lukashenko came to the front of the stage through the 
parliament. From then on, building on the weakness of the system and perhaps even helping 
weaken it himself, Lukashenko took the task of consolidating his power. The curious fact was 
that he did so without the help of a political party. Certainly, Lukashenko was never one of the 
leading party elites in the Soviet days, but he was a member of the communist party, at the peak 
of his career as a young director of a kolkhoz when the BSSR proclaimed independence. 
One of the possible explanations to the specificity of the former Soviet Union (SU) nations is the 
claim that parties in post-Soviet states help grow national identities. The break of the SU 
changed not only the political systems in the former Soviet space, but it changed the view of 
national identity too. Where previously the international appeal of the proletariat guided the 
interests of the state and formulated people’s identities, the national identity had to take the 
empty space in the newly independent nations
46
. To understand what titular nationalities are, we 
need to go back to the 1920’s. This is important to comprehend the value and the uniqueness of a 
national identity in the post-Soviet states today as many of those identities came to life or were at 
least enhanced by the hands of Lenin and Stalin
47
. After initial struggles with identifying and 
sorting, the 1937 census showed 99 nationalities
48
. The primary reason for encouraging self-
determination within the borders of titular identities was preventing secession
49
. Despite the fact 
that national identities are widely deemed as utterly important especially when discussing the 
                                                          
45
 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: at a Crossroads in History, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 
46
 Philip G. Roeder, “Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions”, Slavic 
Review 58, no. 4 (1999): 858. 
47
 Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An 
Institutional Account”, Theory and Society 23, no. 1 (February, 1994): 51. 
48
 Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame, (London: 
Sage Publications Ltd., 1997), 30-31. 
49
 Ibid, 29. 
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viability of new democracies
50
, scholarly research rarely mentioned national identities as forces 
which drive and pull political parties to form and solidify
51
. We see that national identities could 
be reinforced by political parties in new states
52
. In other words, a regime which only recently 
gained independence could allegedly invest in emergence of parties as those parties generate 
national identity even where this identity was originally weak. This adds to the puzzle of weak to 
non-existent parties in Lukashenko’s Belarus53. It must be noted, that Belarus has officially two 
state languages: Belarusian and Russian. However, the practice is more complicated than that. 
On the one hand, it is extremely hard to encounter the Belarusian language spoken on the street 
in Minsk or in the other cities in Belarus
54
. On the other hand, trivial signs as street names and 
public transportations stops are in Belarusian only when one would expect them to be in both 
languages. Consequently, one must assume that the government is pushing for the superiority of 
the national Belarusian language while the people commonly reject it. For the people, the picture 
is more complicated than that. In the 1990’s, at the beginning of the Lukashenko era, Belarusian 
was the language of the opposition. Opposition conferences and meeting were held strictly in 
Belarusian while the government pushed for the supremacy of the Russian language. However, 
today the interests are reversed. The contemporary opposition has no preference for a specific 
language, but looks at it as a tool of communication rather than as a national manifestation. 
Meanwhile, it is the government who now makes attempts at an increased use of the Belarusian 
language officially.  
A place where national identities played a significant role is Kazakhstan. When speaking of a 
titular identity in Kazakhstan, one speaks of the Kazakh identity. The titular identity was usually 
strongly emphasized. However, due to a relatively large non-Kazakh community, the division 
                                                          
50
 See for instance: David Lane, “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary Coup?”, The 
British Journal of Political and International Relations 10, no. 4 (2008): 525-549; Mark R. Beissinger, “A New 
Look at Ethnicity and Democratization”, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 85-97. 
51
 For rare examples see: Carrie Manning, “Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party”, 
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was even more obvious. The tensions between the Kazakh and the Slavic (Russian, Belarusian, 
Ukrainian) identities were allegedly visible
55
. After the independence of Kazakhstan, the strife 
for a strong Kazakh identity unsettled a number of minorities. Unlike the rest of the European 
minorities (German, Polish, Ukrainian etc.), the Russian minority was substantial. Overall, the 
Kazakh language was promoted over the Russian and various Russian organizations and political 
parties were prevented from forming. Nazarbayev sought after the promotion of nationalization 
and the local language through politics and parliament, too. For instance, a special Assembly of 
the People was created which was directed at representation of the ethnic minorities, but was far 
from proportionally representative
56
. We see that despite the original deep integration of 
Russians and the Russian language in the public and social life of Kazakhstan, the nationalistic 
(Kazakh) notions were used to establish a certain political system, which would leave out the 
especially big Russian minority and gather the support of the Kazakhs and the other minorities. 
Thus unlike in Belarus, in Kazakhstan the national identity ticket was played through the usage 
of the political system and the political parties, to strengthen the existing regime.  
Unlike some party systems, in which parties often start at the civilian level, gathering support 
and supporters with the aim of challenging the political power
57
, here parties are looked at in a 
different light. The parties
58
 of Russia and Kazakhstan (the two states in our pool who do have 
ruling parties), are top-bottom structures, rather than bottom-top as in the West
59
. They are tools 
of the leadership and are kept under the strictest control by the elite to limit claims for power 
from the bottom. Nazarbayev used his party as described above, while Lukashenko has not. The 
president of Kazakhstan re-configured and renamed his party, adjusted the system, but never 
actually disbanded the party he was the head of. Nazarbayev used the existing party and the close 
ties it had with the public to build his power, while by the time Lukashenko ascended to power, 
the party mechanism was perhaps less relevant for such a purpose. The most curious case here 
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however, is that of Russia. Yeltsin ascended to power virtually as the ‘destroyer’ of the regime, 
as a revolutionary perhaps, someone who fought the parties. Parties were affiliated with him, but 
he was not officially a member of any party and remained so until the end of his leadership. His 
successor Vladimir Putin rose to power as a non-partisan member of the inner circle of the power 
apparatus. Nevertheless, unlike Yeltsin and Lukashenko he did opt for officially adopting a 
party. Putin’s reasoning for United Russia came from the idea that independents were at times 
harder to control than partisans whereas coming from a structure of power originally, it may have 
appeared to him easier to mute possible mutinies within his party. Some of the independent 
candidates in Russia were either sponsored by oligarchs, or were oligarchs themselves, with their 
capital in hand, capable of financing themselves all the way into the parliament (and potentially 
further). United Russia was kept to protect against such initiatives, especially in the time after the 
magnitude of the oligarchy-based capitalism in Russia revealed itself in all its glory
60
. The quick 
and decisive 1990’s reforms led by one of the key figures at the time, Anatoly Chubais. He 
argued that a fast privatization would leave the sympathizers of the communists no chance to 
resist. Such quick privatization led to a concentration of key industries in the hands of certain 
people; the oligarchs
61
. 
Although the practice in Kazakhstan was one of certain privatization of state assets into “well-
positioned hands”, Belarus refused mass privatization almost entirely62. The regime in Belarus 
used it to prevent resources from the opposition with a stress on keeping the heavy industry and 
the agriculture sector in state’s hands. Moreover, keeping the economy nationalized, Lukashenko 
ensured that deflection from him would not only bare risks but would also hold no economic 
rewards
63
. The Belarus economy is unique and thus was predisposed for Lukashenko’s rule in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it lacked the leadership required to promote initial liberal reforms and 
lagged behind its neighbors. Secondly, this leadership and power arrived at a time of economic 
crisis and caused a certain degree of improvement to the economy. Thirdly, the economic sector 
in Belarus is more production oriented than in Russia due to unavailability of natural resources. 
Fourthly, the ratio of urban population was lower in Belarus than in Russia providing for less 
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capitalist opportunities to begin with. Finally, Belarus’ economic conditions were the fastest 
growing in the Soviet Union. This leads to the idea most people felt improvement during the 
Soviet rule and were disapproving of post-Soviet and pre-Lukashenko economic reforms
64
. 
Moreover, the strategic position of Belarus as discussed above has grave implications for 
economic control, too. This position allowed Lukashenko to increase his bargaining position vis-
à-vis the Russians to a certain extent, but it also served the deepening of the connection of the 
Russian and the Belarusian economies. In fact the Belarusian economy is greatly dependent on 
Russian oil and gas subsidies and other economic allowances
65
. 
Russian economy, as mentioned above, offered various chances for new businesses, through 
natural resources or through huge factories. Kazakhstan grew economically in major part due to 
its own reserves of natural resources
66
. Both cases provided potential opportunities of alternative 
funding for the opposition, which would have resulted in alternative bases of power. In 
comparison; the Belarusian economy has little to offer for outside companies if it was to be 
opened. In other words, state-owned economy in Belarus has happened not only because it suited 
Lukashenko, but also due to the fact that it was more feasible. Parties in Russia were created due 
to a specific junction of events. First, early privatization allowed the financing of opposition and 
pro-government parties. That was followed by trading off the possibility of an inner-partisan 
political threat which might evolve from a partisan structure, for a better control of the governing 
apparatus. Parties in Kazakhstan were adopted, among other things, to enforce the national 
identity and to a lesser extent, to play an enforcing role on the opposition. As such, the power 
was centralized through the party but some privatization and trade were made possible. The 
Belarusian government is in complete control of most of its valuable industries firstly, because 
its economy is not as robust as the economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. Consequently, where 
Putin turned to solve the issue of a better control of parliament members
67
 by the means of 
creating a party, and where Nazarbayev had the party originally installed matters of identity and 
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himself being a previous head of Kazakhstan in the SU days, Lukashenko had no such trouble in 
the first place (no privatization, no identity crisis), leaving the major part of the Belarus economy 
state-led. 
Lukashenko’s rise to power in Belarus was mainly based on the ticket of having an image of 
someone who fights corruption and the newly introduced multiple-parties. In the beginning of 
the 1990’s Lukashenko was one of the most active members in the Belarusian parliament. This, 
together with the fact that he was not considered a political threat, earned him the seat as the 
chairman of the anti-corruption commission in 1993. Lukashenko took this chance, exposing his 
opponents and placing a large part of the blame on the structures of political parties. The 
president addressed parties as an unnecessary middle man. Lukashenko’s aim to present himself 
as a direct representative of the public, and not of the interests of political parties. When 
considering that, Lukashenko’s refusal to turn the Belaya Rus’ movement into a party proper68 
might be based on the idea that for the electorate, parties would mean corruption, something that 
the opposition is busy with. In that way, parties in the opposition are not helping themselves. In 
the public, they are seen as shallow organizations, devoid of any ideological context. 
Belaya Rus’ is considered being the future government party of Belarus which leaves 
Lukashenko with more options open
69
, thus removing any necessity of commitment. 
Nevertheless, Lukashenko himself is not a member of that social movement. This public 
association, being pro-government but not directly guided by the top might serve a different role 
than United Russia for Putin. At present, the movement is still relatively young and labeled 
‘public’ rather than political, suggesting that it belongs to the people rather than the 
government
70
. The leaders of Belaya Rus’ are thought to be pushing for turning the movement 
into a governing party proper. However, Lukashenko is firm in his stand against it. The idea is 
clear especially in light of Lukashenko’s contrast with Putin. The latter is an apparatus person, 
one that has ties throughout the governing structure and knows his ability to control it. The 
former worked his way up from the bottom, understanding that initiating a political party might 
bring benefits to the other activists in Belaya Rus’ but not necessary to Lukashenko himself. That 
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works well with Lukashenko’s hard worked image; of one that belongs to the people, fights 
corruption and the pro-Western attitudes by the opposition. 
Indeed, the government has a number of ways to deal with the opposition in an autocratic 
country. To do so, it definitely helps for the opposition to be relatively known and organized 
which makes it easier to track. Anti-opposition practices allegedly include: blaming parties with 
inherent corruption
71
; and the identification of ‘parties’ with the West. That method of political 
engineering is not unique in Belarus but is argued to occur freely in the post-Soviet world. 
Building on earlier, even on tsarist practices, ‘fake’ parties were created when the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS) was still in control. One of such parties in contemporary 
Russia was the Liberal Democrats (LDP and later LDPR) led by Zhirinovsky. The idea was to 
take votes from the ‘Democrat’ party of the opposition posing as not only Democratic but 
‘Liberal’, too72. Moreover, there were many techniques of initiating such parties (small parties 
and splitters, clones, planted ‘double-agents’ to direct the party)73 but also various ways to hijack 
an election just in case a legitimate opposition party did come across. These included a 
commanding order of how to elect; ballot manipulation (results were manipulated even if there is 
no opposition like there was mostly the case in Kazakhstan); through sponsoring; through 
practically blackmailing citizens by turning off their heating or electricity
74
. We can see that 
similarly to Yeltsin, Lukashenko tried to impose the image of someone who ‘rescued’ Belarus 
from the hands of the parties, someone who brought back the ‘good’ parts of the old regime, 
discarding the allegedly wrong parts (parties) away. However, it still does not fully explain the 
inability of parties to emerge later on in Lukashenko’s rule. 
Learning and innovating 
Modern autocracies could be seen as sources of learning and political innovation. Looking at 
what is happening to his partners for the Eurasian Economic Community (Russia and 
Kazakhstan), may have helped Lukashenko to set a route for his own political organization. 
Lukashenko understood that he could not make a party as in Kazakhstan, having no according 
elitist basis. He has seen Putin’s alleged success with United Russia in controlling the oligarchs 
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at home. However, Lukashenko understood that another way was simply keeping these industries 
on hand, thus cutting the chances of opposition arising on that front to begin with. Creating a 
ruling party would perhaps nullify his hardly fought efforts for a non-aligned, simple Belarusian 
image and would potentially give a chance for the local opposition to establish itself. Thus unlike 
Nazarbayev who was invested in the party, Lukashenko had no such commitment. Unlike 
Yeltsin in the 1990’s who refused to control a large party officially on the one hand, but helped 
privatizing state-owned industries and by doing so sponsor the rise of oligarchs, Lukashenko left 
the Belarusian government in control of all key industries. Finally, unlike Putin who then had to 
deal with oligarchs and the question of power control by the means of political party, 
Lukashenko found it easier to deal with the situation as it is, leaving little room for independent 
threat to develop, and preventing such a threat of rising from within a potentially strong political 
party. This proves the general notion developed from the population in my research. The public 
in Belarus appear to be satisfied with a status-quo, relying on the ‘devil you know’, rather than 
risking something for an alternative. 
We have seen that two of the factors contributing to the failure of parties to gain power are the 
lack of ideological basis on the one hand and the inability to compete for governing positions on 
the other. Potential voters were seeing parties as representing no ‘special’, ideological values, 
and were mostly open and adamant about the fact that the opposition cannot achieve a position of 
power. If this is the case, a legitimate question arises: Why vote at all? Why a large part of the 
voters in Belarus take an interest in the elections and cast their vote? Why attend elections 
meetings or listen to political campaigns? As mentioned above, the SMD electoral system in 
Belarus (and indeed world-wide) allows for independent candidates to parliament more so than 
other known systems. However, basing myself on the interviews, I can proclaim that the work of 
parliamentarians in Belarus is not devoid of content. Being a personality-based electoral system, 
SMD allows for more direct contact of the representative with his or her constituencies. 
Although in liberal democracies the link between the representatives and the voters is based upon 
the former’s will to be reelected75, in Belarus such a link is available too. Thus, the SMD not 
only allows for the independent candidates to emerge, but it provides them with a tool to get 
elected, by leveling the playing field with the party-representatives. The result is a distorted 
version of what has been labeled pork barrel politics. The ‘pork barrel’ system operates in a way, 
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where elected representative work in a way, that their own district would benefit the most. 
Benefits are geographically targeted, and even economically inefficient project are given a green 
light
76
. It is distorted, because where in liberal democracies the model is mainly used to describe 
those economic inefficiencies
77
, in Belarus it could be used to help explaining why voting 
occurs. In fact, it was consisted throughout the interviews. My interviewees seemed to decide 
upon whom to vote for, based on the familiarity of the candidate, combined with what this 
candidate can do for them on a local level. So a former parliament member underlined to me, 
that his elections campaign was based upon ‘solving issues’, rather than striving for power or 
promoting ideologies, two issues we have already mentioned not to be a part of Belarusian 
parliamentary politics. Consequently, the parliament members are using the (sometimes very 
narrow) leeway place they have to try and help their constituencies (or at the very least promise 
to do so). Thus, since parties cannot offer the ideological substance or promise an influential 
place in the government, all that remains is the potential solving of local issues. Based on that, 
more and more partisan candidates in Belarus are running their election campaign concentrating 
on this notion, thus giving up the advantages the party could have provided them with originally. 
If so, the capturing of the power by the ruling apparatus by above mentioned methods, with 
president Lukashenko at its front, causes the failure of parties, but also in a way promotes the 
link between voters and their representatives. We see that the SMD electoral system is crucial to 
understanding the emergence of independent members of parliament in Belarus, and the public’s 
remaining will to cast a vote. However, we have also seen that the SMD has not explained the 
full picture. Building on it, we showed above how inherited political institutions were addressed 
when Lukashenko ascended to power and how he deals with political parties through his 
presidency. Parties are not allowed to achieve political power and so cannot build themselves 
from the top, but parties also struggle to find ideological basis and so find it hard to build 
themselves from the bottom. Political parties in Belarus are kept at status quo: not strong enough 
to challenge for power, but also not weak enough to disappear. 
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed at explaining the evolution of independent representation in parliament of 
Belarus, in comparison to a lesser presence in Russia and Kazakhstan. The first step was 
explaining the influence of the SMD electoral system. It was found that although it provides the 
ground for independent candidates. Next, the possibility of structural influences was examined. It 
was suggested that the initial policies of Lukashenko, the president of Belarus are responsible for 
holding the parties weak. Finally, it was added that the top-down structure which emptied parties 
of any governing possibilities and personality based elections are crucial in the weakness of 
parties in Belarus. There is no sole reason which is responsible for the absence of political parties 
in the Belarusian parliament. Instead, it is a combination of the basis of power, the electoral 
system, but chiefly the way the governing system were designed. 
The practical implications are wide. A system of governance, in which parliamentary candidates 
run and are elected based on personal attributes and the solutions they intend to use in order to 
deal with local issues, may well be an alternative to a party system in which solutions are 
constrained by decades-old party ideology. The governing system, despite offering a strong 
authoritarian regime, still has a pluralistic society, in which some debates are still happening. 
Opposition and pro-governmental movements operate with a degree of freedom and the state 
provides a stable ruling mechanism. Independent representation might be a legitimate alternative 
to the partisan rule. The theoretical framework provides interesting aspects for political science 
as well. The method of field interviews combined with literature which included both Western 
and Belarusian/Russian authors provided a new insight into an established authoritarian regime. 
The conclusions drawn above, were common to most of the interviewees, with the varying 
background of the respondents playing little role in their answer. 
This paper is an example of innovation in authoritarian regimes. We have seen how a relatively 
unknown regime manages to not only survive for over two decades, but remain stable even in the 
face of turmoil in nearby states combined with economic crises. Nevertheless, this paper has only 
opened the first door. Future research ought to continue its route, with a more extensive round of 
interviews, including citizens in Russia and Kazakhstan, countries which were only included in 
the current paper for comparison. This would allow us to extend the conclusions drawn above, 
and proclaim stronger assumptions. Belarus remains largely a riddle. This research though, is the 
first step towards unlocking it. 
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Appendix 1 
To make this research a reality, cognitive interviews were assessed, and supplemented by a 
comprehensive reading of the main Belarusian newspaper
78
 with the aim of tracing back the 
official view on political parties. The field interviews (N = 18) were conducted with randomly 
selected adults of Belarusian nationality, who were at least illegible to vote in the previous 
parliamentary elections of 2012. Most of my interviewees live in the electoral districts of Minsk. 
For reasons of variance, one interviewee came from the city of Brest, and two from Gomel. It 
can be said, that no substantial difference was found based on geographic changes
79
. Three of the 
respondents emigrated from Belarus in the early 2000’s, which produced the opportunity of 
comparing contemporary views to how the electoral process was perceived at the day. The 
youngest interviewees were in their 20’s, while the oldest was in his early 70’s. Respondents 
came from varying educational backgrounds: from no higher education, to a full professor status 
and one former parliament member. Overall, there was an equal distribution on the gender 
variable. All interviews were conducted in the Russian language, which I command fluently. 
                                                          
78
 The leading newspaper in Belarus today is “Belarus Segodnya” (Belarus today) which is accepted as the word of 
the government. Online data is freely available from 2000. For earlier additions the Belarus national archives in 
Minsk would have to be visited. Belarus’ Segodnya (SB), http://www.sb.by [accessed: 24 March, 2015]; Archivi 
Belarus’, http://archives.gov.by [accessed: 24 March, 2015]. 
79
 Interviews would be conducted over the internet, or preferably face to face to allow a more cognitive approach; G. 
Willis, Cognitive interviewing. A “how to” guide, Meeting of the American Statistical Association, To be 
downloaded from: http://www.uiowa.edu/~c07b209/interview.pdf, (1999): 3-9; Examples of questions which will 
guide my inquiry could be found in appendix 1. Please note that they will be notasked directly: these question will 
merely serve as guides through the set of cognitive interviews. 
